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THE EVOLUTION OF PLATFORM BUSINESS MODELS:  
EXPLORING COMPETITIVE BATTLES IN THE WORLD OF PLATFORMS 
Abstract: In recent decades, multi-sided platform business models have become an important 
avenue for value creation and capture, but the phenomenon itself remains under-theorized. 
We address this gap and present new, empirically-driven insights into how platform business 
models evolve in a context of fierce competition. Through a longitudinal, qualitative study of 
twelve multi-sided platforms that operate under challenging industry conditions, we discover 
that success in platform battles can plausibly be explained by a combination of complexity in 
the business model design, and the simultaneous use of innovation and imitation to create 
highly intricate systems of activities. We further discuss how our findings open several new 
avenues for future platform research. 
INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of wireless and Internet technologies has brought opportunities for the 
creation of new organizational forms (Eckhardt et al., 2018; Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017; 
McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2018; Teece, 2018). Firms like 
Alibaba and Uber have adopted new ways of structuring firm and industry boundaries by 
shifting organizational design away from selling products towards the facilitation of 
economic exchanges between two or more (related) user groups (e.g., riders and drivers in 
case of Uber). Such multi-sided platforms mediate user interactions and therefore differ from 
firms that control a linear series of activities as well as from manufacturing platforms that 
orchestrate a network of suppliers to build a family of related products (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014). Moreover, compared to intermediaries outside the 
digital economy (e.g., insurance brokers, some department stores), these multi-sided 
platforms can introduce new transaction mechanisms more rapidly and at much lower cost. 
A noteworthy factor in the growth of multi-sided platforms in the digital economy is 
fierce rivalry between platforms that target the same user base. There is the micro-blogging 
site Pownce, out-performed by Twitter. The social network Orkut, which was very popular in 
Brazil but (despite being operated by platform star Google) did not survive competition with 
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Facebook and Myspace. The transportation network Sidecar, which pioneered the peer-to-
peer ride-sharing model, lost in competition with Uber and Lyft. Looking at the platform 
landscape, Van Alstyne and Parker (2017, p. 28) conclude: “For every successful platform, 
there are many more that struggle or simply don’t make it” – dynamics that may eventually 
give rise to a winner-take-all outcome (Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2015; Cusumano et al., 2019; 
Gawer, 2014; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). 
Yet, despite this recognition that competitive dynamics play a critical role in the 
development and growth of multi-sided platforms, there has been surprisingly little 
systematic empirical inquiry into this aspect of the platform phenomenon. While a deeper 
understanding of how to create viable multi-sided platforms in a context of fierce competition 
is needed, prior platform research has largely neglected competitive interactions in the 
process of creating and growing new organizational forms that mediate transactions between 
user groups, and mostly focused on single design parameters that give users a good reason to 
join and keep using the platform: notably, the creation of new features and add-ons that 
attract users (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano, 2008), the adoption of activities that enable 
frictionless platform access (e.g., Parker et al., 2016), and the choice of mechanism to match 
users effectively (e.g., Wei and Lin, 2017). These studies echo the logic of Katz and Shapiro 
(1985; 1994) and view network effects as a source of competitive advantage in platforms, 
since “consumers place a higher value on platforms with a larger number of users” (Cennamo 
and Santaló, 2013: p. 1331). While this stream of platform research has vastly enhanced our 
understanding of platform characteristics, a focus on individual design parameters is 
problematic for both theory and practice for at least two reasons. First, a focus on specific 
design elements that promote the growth of the user base may explain and predict network 
effects, but not the underlying mechanisms that lead to the creation of such design elements 
or interdependence between them. In other words, we know a good deal about the nature of 
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single pieces in a platform “puzzle”, but how the pieces emerge under conditions of intense 
rivalry and fit together remains undertheorized. Second, since multi-sided platforms operate 
“in a setting that calls for highly interdependent decisions” (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018, p. 
1391), the creation of a successful platform may require holistic thinking, i.e., attention to the 
entire architectural recipe rather than just to single ingredients (Andries et al., 2013; 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2010). As an example, a multi-sided 
platform like Airbnb needs to make decisions about whether to include a rating system for 
guests or not, how precisely to link travelers with hosts, and who provides insurance for listed 
properties, often simultaneously. Yet, the implications of such interdependent decisions for 
platform success are unknown. 
This article, then, addresses two research questions. First, how can we describe and 
analyze interconnected and interdependent decisions in the development of multi-sided 
platform designs? A second question relates to the design of a platform in its competitive 
context – how do some multi-sided platforms succeed in the competitive battle for market 
leadership, while many more perish? 
To answer the research questions, a level of analysis is needed that allows us to 
describe the design of a platform firm’s set of boundary-spanning exchanges in toto, and 
permits the analysis of dynamic changes therein, in response to competition. We argue that 
this level of analysis is the business model – a “system that is made up of components, 
linkages between the components, and dynamics” (Afuah and Tucci, 2000, p. 4). On the one 
hand, the business model identifies transaction partners, establishes the value proposition(s) 
for each partner, and describes how a focal firm connects to them (Baden-Fuller and 
Mangematin, 2013; McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). On the other hand, it defines how value 
is delivered, monetized, and shared among transaction partners (Johnson et al., 2008; Teece, 
2010). The business model, therefore, refers to the overall gestalt of interlinked boundary-
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spanning transactions and interdependent activities that enable value creation and capture 
(Zott and Amit, 2008). We follow prior research and conceptualize a business model as a 
system of activities that can be described through design elements, namely activity content, 
structure, and governance (Foss and Saebi, 2018; Snihur and Zott, 2019; Zott and Amit, 
2010). We begin our theoretical analysis from this activity system perspective because it 
allows us to ground our contribution solidly in prior work (Amit and Zott, 2001; Zott and 
Amit, 2007; 2008; 2010) before going beyond it by considering competitive dynamics in the 
evolution of multi-sided platform business models. 
We develop our argument on the basis of an inductive multiple case study (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2013) that explores the evolution of twelve multi-sided platform business models 
in the Chinese Online Group Buying (OGB) industry between 2011 and 2013. The OGB 
platform business model, pioneered in 2009 by Groupon in the U.S., brings together local 
merchants and online consumers by offering products or services with deep discounts, should 
a certain number of fellow consumers buy the same product or service within a limited time 
period. The Chinese OGB industry is a compelling empirical field in which to address our 
research question for three reasons. Firstly, when the market emerged in 2010, all entrants 
chose to copy Groupon’s platform business model, i.e., the starting point for designing the 
business model was similar for all companies. Using Groupon’s business model as a 
reference enabled us to document the whole evolution of each of the business models as they 
unfolded. Secondly, OGB firms must deal with many of the challenges faced by platform 
providers working with two or more groups of transaction partners. For example, a design 
choice in the business model made in relation to one user group may have consequences for 
another one. Indeed, in our setting, the OGB firms evolved from operating two-sided 
platform business models in 2010 towards multi-sided business models in 2013 by integrating 
complementors such as e-malls, app developers, online travel agents, and cloud computing 
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providers, which increased architectural challenges, as structural interdependencies in the 
business model became more complex. Thirdly, this market was characterized by intense 
competition and volatility: it emerged, grew, was shaken-up, and stabilized in just four years. 
The number of platform firms operating in the Chinese OGB market grew significantly in a 
short period of time, reaching a maximum in September 2011 when the market was crowded 
with 5,058 platforms, falling to only 213 by December 2013, with just two platforms 
dominating the market with a combined share of 75%. This resolution of the life-cycle of the 
industry, 2010-14, provided a clear solution to the eternal problem of choosing an appropriate 
period over which to evaluate platform performance. 
We claim that our results contribute to platform research in several ways. Firstly, by 
extending Amit and Zott’s (2001) activity system perspective into the platform context we 
provide a more complete picture of the heuristic logic that connects platform characteristics 
with the realization of economic value. In particular, a focus on the pattern of transactions 
that the platform firm mediates between groups of users allows us to argue theoretically, and 
show empirically, that a focus on the platform business model, as a source of value creation 
and capture, can help explain why some platform firms outperform others, and can provide a 
basis for analyzing how platform business models unfold over time. Secondly, while prior 
research offers several explanations for the success of platforms like Airbnb or Amazon, 
including critical strategic choices such as where to play (and why) (Cusumano et al., 2019; 
Eisenmann et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2014) and what competitive strategy to adopt (e.g., 
differentiation vs. cost leadership) (Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Seamans and Zhu, 2017), 
prior research leaves unexplored another likely contributor to the success of platforms: that 
their founders designed an effective business model. By revealing that the design of business 
models contributes to platform performance, we thus complement prior research that has 
considered alternative determinants of platform performance. Thirdly, by embracing the 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
6 
 
competitive actions of platform firms and the responses elicited, we provide a fine-grained 
approach to understanding what specific platforms do when they compete with specific 
rivals. Although the engagement between firms is arguably central to firm survival and 
competitive advantage (e.g., Bettis and Weeks, 1987; Chen and Miller, 2015; Lamberg et al., 
2009; Mansfield et al., 1981; Teece, 1986), the role of competitive action and response in the 
evolution of multi-sided platform business models remains largely unexplored in the platform 
literature. Our results extend the discussion about platform success (e.g., Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2015; Cennamo and Santaló, 2015; Eisenmann et al., 2006; 
McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017; Rietveld and Eggers, 2018), showing that business model 
innovation and imitation are central components of platform firm behavior in a rivalrous 
situation. Specifically, we observe that both business model innovation and imitation enable 
OGB platform firms to grow and adjust their business model, but our longitudinal study also 
reveals that focused commitment to one of these two mechanisms jeopardizes long-term 
survival. In contrast, the market leaders that emerged from intensive competitive battles 
pursued business model innovation and imitation simultaneously. Finally, focusing on 
changes in the architecture of a platform’s activity system, we show that the number of 
business model design elements and the level of interdependence between them has a critical 
influence on platform performance. Successful platform firms create complex business model 
designs, i.e., highly interdependent activity systems with a large number of design elements, 
while platforms that created loosely-coupled activity systems, thus concentrating on creating 
simple business model designs, lost competitiveness. This discovery allows us to draw a new 
connection between prior organization literature (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; 
Siggelkow, 2002; 2011) and platform research, and it enables us to generate plausible, 
conjecturable explanations for platform success and failure that can facilitate future theory 
development and empirical research. 
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MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM BUSINESS MODELS 
Multi-sided Platforms 
In this section, we define multi-sided platforms, conceptually differentiate multi-sided 
platforms from other organizational forms that involve two or more transaction partners, and 
highlight different streams of platform research that are relevant to the proposed activity 
system perspective.  
Prior literature characterizes multi-sided platforms as hubs or intermediaries for value 
exchanges between two or more markets of users and producers (Gawer, 2014; Hagiu and 
Wright, 2015; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005). For example, 
Cennamo and Santaló (2015, p. 12) define multi-sided platforms as “networks that bring 
together two or more distinct types of users and facilitate transactions among them”, and 
McIntyre and Srinivasan (2017, p. 143) conceptualize multi-sided platforms as “interfaces 
that can serve to mediate transactions between two or more sides”. Implicit in these 
definitions is the notion that value creation through multi-sided platforms is dependent on 
enabling interactions between different sides of the market, or as Chakravarty et al. (2014, p. 
3) note: “a core benefit that each side seeks from the platform is access to participants on the 
other side.” An example for a multi-sided platform is the e-commerce marketplace eBay that 
facilitates consumer-to-consumer and business-to-consumer sales. eBay’s role is to attract 
participants to join, consummate matches between buyers and sellers, and facilitate value-
creating exchanges by providing transactional architecture, and setting rules and standards. 
Unlike businesses organized in traditional buyer-supplier relationships, i.e., so called 
“pipeline businesses” that control a linear series of activities along the value chain (Van 
Alstyne et al., 2016), multi-sided platforms do not take ownership1 of products but rather 
depend on resources (e.g., skills, ideas, physical assets) and activities controlled and provided 
                                                          
1
 This does not preclude a multi-sided platform from, simultaneously, operating as a producer of goods and 
services. Amazon, for example, operates a marketplace that connects independent sellers with consumers and, at 
the same time, offers its own products and services (e.g., Alexa, Kindle).  
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by agents on different sides of a market (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Boudreau and Jeppesen, 
2015; Thomas et al., 2014). In other words, the role of a multi-sided platform is not to 
develop, manufacture or (re)sell products and services but to connect different sides of a 
market (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2009). This is also what differentiates multi-sided platforms from 
manufacturing or product platforms that firms may use to optimize manufacturing of a 
product or a family of related products in concert with a network of suppliers (Gawer, 2014; 
Krishnan and Gupta, 2001). Airbus, for example, operates a manufacturing platform to source 
around 80% of its activities from more than 12,000 suppliers worldwide. Using its platform, 
Airbus can leverage exchange relationships to access external competencies, share products 
and services across different aircraft types, and stimulate product development with and 
among its supplier base. Yet, although Airbus arguably plays a central, orchestrating role 
within a network of firms, it is still a product-centric business that focuses on the ownership 
and sale of products. Moreover, Airbus does not view its suppliers as being required to 
interact with its customers. Hence, in contrast to multi-sided platforms, interaction here 
between different sides is not a condition for value creation in manufacturing platforms. 
Table 1 summarizes the differences between pipeline businesses, manufacturing platforms, 
and multi-sided platforms. 
----------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
----------------------------------- 
Given the interdependent relationship between two or more sides of multi-sided 
platforms, prior research suggests that such platforms are characterized by the presence of 
strong network externalities (Evans, 2003; Hagiu, 2007; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2005). In the case of a two-sided platform, the logic is that a larger installed 
base of producers offering products on the platform leads to greater demand for that platform 
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and, concomitantly, having more consumers leads to a larger supply of products (Boudreau 
and Jeppesen, 2015; Church et al., 2008; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017; Song et al., 2018; 
Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). The prospect of such cross-platform or indirect network effects2 is 
reflected in the platform literature’s emphasis on platform parameters that give transaction 
partners a good reason to join and keep using the platform. The parameters explored to attract 
and lock-in large numbers of exchange partners include sweetheart deals and exclusive 
contracting for producers (e.g., Armstrong and Wright, 2007; Hagiu, 2009; Yoffie and Kwak, 
2006), policies to govern and influence behaviors of transaction partners (e.g., Maurer and 
Tiwana 2012; Tiwana et al. 2010), the creation of new features and add-ons that attract users 
(e.g., Gawer & Cusumano, 2008), offering convenient and reliable ways to close transactions 
(Hagiu, 2014), and ways of matching users effectively, with corresponding terms at which 
transactions occur (e.g., Wei & Lin, 2017). Studies have also considered different 
monetization models for the different sides of markets, such as sacrificing profits on one side 
to grow the number of consumers and, in return, making the platform more attractive for 
producers on the other side (e.g., Clements and Ohashi, 2005; Eisenmann et al., 2006). This 
focus on selected design parameters offers valuable guidance on how individual choices may 
relate to the growth of the installed user base and the impact such choices have on the other 
side of a platform market, but it falls short on fully explaining how a set of growing and 
interacting design choices impacts platform design over time. While confirming the presence 
of network effects and analyzing the consequences of individual choices is undoubtedly 
important to advance the study of multi-sided platforms, existing research has been relatively 
silent on the theoretically and managerially important question of how the design of a multi-
sided platform evolves as a whole, i.e. as a business model. 
                                                          
2
 Same-side or direct network effects are also possible (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; Chu and Manchanda, 2016; Evans 
and Schmalensee, 2010). 
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Another stream of platform research has examined interdependent value creation in 
platforms by a multilateral set of partners, especially in the context of platforms like Apple 
iOS or Mozilla Firefox that provide a standard with a technological core upon which a 
community of developers build (Adner, 2017; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Ceccagnoli et al., 
2012; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). Studies in this stream of the literature have focused on 
structural and evolutionary mechanisms as well as the alignment of partners that enable value 
co-creation, including the management and coordination of complementors to a platform 
(e.g., Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2015; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Rietveld and Eggers, 2018). 
Scholars have also begun to consider the bundling of adjacent platforms (e.g., Facebook’s 
integration of Instagram) or “envelopment” (Eisenmann et al., 2011) as a market entry 
strategy and associated demand spillovers in complementary markets (Li and Agarwal, 
2017). Hence, this stream recognizes the need to go beyond the platform provider and 
consider connections and interactions with stakeholders that play a critical role in value 
creation. However, while current theorizing in this part of the platform literature can be used 
to explain the role of cooperation and competition with value-creation partners for the 
success of multi-sided platforms, it falls short of fully explaining how viable multi-sided 
platforms emerge and evolve when competing platforms target the same user and 
complementor base. Although competition between an entrant platform and an incumbent has 
been explored (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Seamans and Zhu, 2014; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012), prior 
platform research remains silent on how multi-sided platform firms interact when they all 
start from the same position and compete head-to-head in a new market where a dominant 
player is not yet established. 
 
Platforms as Activity Systems  
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A concept that allows us to study these questions is the business model. Over the last 
two decades, the business model has proliferated in both theory and practice as a concept 
central to firms’ survival and growth (Foss and Saebi, 2017; Snihur and Zott, 2019; Sohl et 
al., 2018; Ritter and Lettl, 2018; Wirtz et al., 2016). A business model elucidates how a firm 
creates and captures value in concert with transaction partners such as customers and 
suppliers (Priem et al., 2018; von Delft et al., 2018; Zott et al., 2011). On the one hand, the 
business model identifies transaction partners, establishes the value proposition(s) for each 
partner, and describes how a focal firm connects to them (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 
2013; McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). On the other hand, the business model defines how 
value is delivered, monetized and shared among transaction partners (Johnson et al., 2008; 
Teece, 2010). The business model, therefore, refers to the overall gestalt of interlinked 
boundary-spanning transactions and activities that enable value creation and capture (Zott 
and Amit, 2008). Similarly, Chesbrough (2007, p. 12) defines a business model as “a series of 
activities, from procuring raw materials to satisfying the final consumer”, and Massa and 
Tucci (2013, p. 9) argue that a business models captures “how an organization orchestrates its 
system of activities.” 
An activity in a firm’s business model refers to the engagement of resources (human, 
physical, capital etc.) of the focal firm or of any transaction partner to fulfil customers’ needs 
and create customer benefits while delivering value to the focal firm and its partners (Zott 
and Amit, 2010). The focus here is on the key activities that create value for transaction 
partners and the focal firm (every firm also performs generic activities that do not create 
competitive differentiation). Activities in a focal firm’s business model enable the delivery of 
the value proposition(s) in a repeatable and scalable way (Johnson et al., 2008), and they can 
be performed by any party to the business model (Zott and Amit, 2007; 2008). The business 
model can then be defined as the content, structure, and governance of activities between the 
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focal firm and its transaction partners (Amit and Zott, 2001). Activity content refers to those 
activities that need to be performed to enable value creation and appropriation; activity 
structure captures the order or sequencing in which transactions take place, but also the 
choice of market mechanism; and activity governance refers to who performs certain 
activities, thus reflecting what partners make a business model work (Zott and Amit, 2010). 
To illustrate, consider the example of a peer-to-peer lending platform that matches the supply 
and demand of funds: when creating the business model, choices need to be made in relation 
to what activities need to be performed to satisfy lenders’ and borrowers’ needs, how to 
match demand and supply of funds, and who undertakes activities such as setting interest 
rates (e.g., lenders vs. intermediary company). Moreover, choices among activity content, 
structure, and governance can be highly interdependent. A lending platform that chooses an 
auction mechanism to uncover the price (a structural choice that settled the question of how 
investors and fundraisers are matched) has also made a governance choice because it shifted 
the activity of choosing the price to market participants. 
This definition of a business model as the architecture or system of interdependent and 
interconnected activities underlying value creation and capture is “precise, unifying (without 
being overly inclusive)” (Foss and Saebi, 2018, p. 13). Indeed, defining business models as 
activity systems is particularly useful to study platform firms since a focus on 
interdependencies among activities allows us to account for sets of structural relationships 
between the platform provider and its users, i.e., what Baden-Fuller and Haefliger (2013, p. 
419) refer to as a business model “containing cause and effect relationships”, and it provides 
insights into the processes that enable the evolution of a platform firm’s business model over 
time (Zott and Amit, 2010). In particular, studying changes among activity content, structure, 
and governance allows to explore the design, management, and alteration of interdependent 
systems under conditions of intense rivalry.  
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OGB BUSINESS MODELS: CONTENT, STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 
Business model designers often borrow from existing firms and, in doing so, use well-honed 
and legitimate business models as templates (Amit and Zott, 2015; Frankenberger and Stam, 
2019). Such templates are a proof-of-concept and can be used by founders of new ventures to 
reflect on established ways of organizing transactions and activities and to “recycle” 
successful design elements prior to market entrance (Snihur and Zott, 2015). 
In our study of the Chinese OGB industry, all cases used the business model of the e-
commerce marketplace Groupon, pioneered in 2009 in the U.S., as a template from which to 
copy elements, i.e. Groupon’s business model was accepted as the default solution for OGB 
platforms that enable interactions between consumers and local merchants. The OGB 
business model creates value by connecting local commerce, increasing consumer buying 
power and local merchants’ sales through price and discovery. For example, merchants can 
benefit from transacting on an OGB platform by reaching new customers and selling slow 
moving items in their inventory or unutilized services and consumers can discover and save 
on new products or services. From an activity system perspective, this business model 
template can be characterized as follows (see Appendix A for the depiction of the activity 
system): 
 Activity content: On one side of the OGB business model, the focal platform firm 
performs activities such as attracting local merchants (e.g., restaurants, bars, spas, and 
hair salons), negotiating discounts, and crafting offerings into so-called deals. On the 
other side of the business model, the deals are offered to consumers. Here, the 
platform performs activities such as promoting deals, attracting consumers, and 
facilitating online transactions. Once a transaction is completed, the OGB platform 
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pays the merchant and performs activities to manage customer relationships on both 
sides of the platform (e.g., subscriptions). 
 Activity structure: enabling and enriching interactions between online consumers and 
local merchants is at the heart of the OGB business model. The activity structure 
defines the sequence of activities and describes the exchange mechanism that enables 
interactions between consumers and local merchants. For example, a structural choice 
in Groupon’s original business model is to offer, each day, one deal for local services 
in a city at a certain discount (“deals of the day”) and the deal is only valid if a certain 
number of consumers purchase the deal within 24 hours. 
 Activity governance: in the OGB business model, the platform provides, for example, 
transactional infrastructure, sets rules and standards (e.g., restrictions on platform 
access), and controls activities to attract users and consummate matches among users 
on both sides. Other activities in the business model are not performed by the 
platform but by consumers and merchants (e.g., consumers print transaction codes at 
home and use deals in local stores that supply the product/service offered on the 
platform).  
Designers of such a multi-sided platform business model make decisions on all these 
parameters, often at the same time. For example, one of the cases we observed, attracted 
cinemas as platform participants and, after a while, integrated forward by offering digital 
solutions to cinemas in the form of ticket selling and collection systems. This was a 
governance choice (settling the question who performs ticket sales and collection) but at the 
same time constituted a decision about content. Hence, design elements in OGB platform 
activity systems can be seen as highly interdependent. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
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To explain why some platforms succeeded in competitive battles, we adopted an inductive, 
multiple-case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989), where prior theory provided concepts but not 
relationships for a deductive study. Multiple cases permit a replication logic (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007), and facilitate early and nascent theorization of a phenomenon.  
The empirical setting for this study is the Chinese OGB industry. When this industry 
emerged in 2010, entry barriers were low because of advances in digital technologies. A 
small team could start an OGB platform by simply looking for merchants in a local area and 
matching them with consumers. As a result, thousands of OGB platforms (5,058 at their peak) 
emerged between 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 1). This period was characterized by low 
switching cost for both consumers and merchants. Indeed, at this peak, users frequently used 
multiple OGB platforms at the same time to find cheaper deals and better services. At this 
early stage of development, the vast majority of OGB platforms, therefore, focused on 
survival by rapidly getting to scale.  
Using Groupon’s business model as a template, all firms started by copying the 
business model of Groupon, but the Chinese OGB platforms presented great varieties in 
business model designs over four years (2010-2014). In this process of business model 
evolution, innovations and imitations in this market were highly transparent to competitors 
and researchers. Chinese OGB firms frequently communicate with the public about changes 
to their business models (e.g., to promote new features to users) and systematically monitor 
competitors’ moves. Moreover, competitive moves by OGB firms are reviewed on a regular 
basis by tech bloggers, business press, and other online publishers, which provided further 
insights into platform competition in this market. This multi-sidedness in the platform 
business model design (see also Appendix A), the transparency of competitive moves, and 
the impressive market growth rate together with the rapid churn of companies as a result of 
performance variations over a short period of time (see Figure 1) made the Chinese OGB 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
16 
 
market a rich and unique context for the study of platform competition and the evolution of 
platform business models. 
----------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
----------------------------------- 
Case Sampling 
In the Chinese OGB industry, we sampled twelve multisided platforms (see Table 2) 
that competed intensively based on a great number of business model innovations and 
imitations. To avoid a selection bias, we purposefully studied both successful and 
unsuccessful platform firms based on their sales performance and market share between 2010 
and 2013 (see Figure 2). Our sample covers the biggest Chinese OGB firm at the time of 
study as well as firms that failed and subsequently left the market. The platforms in our 
sample accounted for 99.6% of OGB sales in 2013. The cases differed in their respective 
business model evolution processes but were relatively homogeneous in terms of other 
parameters that affect performance. First, the discount rate (60%-70%) and commission rate 
(10%-15%) were similar across the platforms, which requires OGB firms to move away from 
relatively simple price competition and explore the competitive advantages rising from the 
overall architecture design of the activity system. Second, the cases were all digital start-ups 
that came into existence at a similar point in time (Table 2). Although two cases had parent 
companies, the existing businesses of the parent companies (e.g., online security services) 
were very different from OGB and no parent company had access to merchant resources. 
Thus, there was no significant migration of user base at start-up and all cases begun 
operations with an installed user base of zero. Third, there was no difference in the nature of 
the founding team in that all founders had prior business experience and expertise in 
information technology but not in OGB platform business models. The homogeneity of cases 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
17 
 
in terms of parameters provides a level of confidence in explaining the success/failure of the 
platforms by exploring their business model evolution processes. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 2 HERE 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Data Collection 
To capture longitudinal dynamics, we conducted two rounds of data collection in 2013 
and 2014. In the first round we recorded changes in the business models of the twelve cases 
from their founding (mostly in 2010) to 2012, while the second round focused on changes 
between 2012 and 2013. We performed 23 semi-structured interviews with founders/co-
founders as key informants. To triangulate the information received from the founder(s) of 
large companies (>1,000 employees), we additionally interviewed 8 top managers. 
Furthermore, we interviewed 16 industry experts, including the director and associate director 
of the Chinese OGB Association, journalists, and government officials, to ensure reliability 
of the data for each case. In total, 47 semi-structured interviews, each lasting one to three 
hours, were carried out, resulting in 68 hours of recorded data. To triangulate the primary 
data, we collected extensive volumes of secondary data such as newspaper articles, market 
reports, and blogs, amounting to between 60 to 600 items per case (see Table 2). The two 
rounds of data collection generated a total of 5,034 single-spaced pages of data. 
In the first stage of primary data collection, each interview opened with questions 
concerning the chronological narrative of the firm’s business model development since it 
entered the market. Here, we asked respondents to describe (1) their original platform 
business model, (2) any changes to the activity content, structure, and governance, (3) how 
these changes were accomplished (e.g., the existing activity structure was modified to 
successfully integrate a new activity content), and (4) the linkage and coherence between the 
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individual changes. In the second stage, we asked about the role of competition in the 
development of the platform’s business model, exploring whether any change was 
attributable to an innovation or an imitation. In the third stage, we solicited data on the 
contribution of innovations or imitations to performance as well as on how the successive 
combinations of innovations and imitations together enabled the platform firm to increase 
sales, the most critical indicator used by firms themselves to measure their own performance. 
When interviewees reported the effects of innovations and imitations on sales explicitly (e.g., 
an increase in the platform’s user base, repeat purchase rate, or website visits), we 
triangulated their assessment with sales data provided by the firms. All questions were open-
ended, enabling interviewees to fully reflect on the evolution of their platform business model 
and competitive dynamics. 
 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis started by delineating the business model evolution process case-by-
case, mapping changes in activity content, structure, and governance that had the effect of 
changing the entire business model. The analysis identified 329 single changes in total, which 
formed the chronological narrative of how the business model of each case evolved over the 
four years. Following a mainly inductive approach, the 329 individual changes were then 
coded as business model innovation or imitation. The chronologies were sent back to the 
interviewees, confirming the validity of the initial coding in terms of the sequence, content, 
and initiatives of the innovations and imitations. The essence of innovation in a platform 
business model is the conceptualization and creation of new ways of facilitating value-
creating exchanges on the platform, which can be achieved by introducing new activities, 
new ways of linking activities, and/or new ways of governing activities in the platform 
business model. For example, Case B extended the business model by integrating app 
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developers (e.g., digital map, weather forecasting, social media) into the platform and 
introduced new activities such as data sharing and app co-creation, which also had 
consequences for the activity governance and structure. More examples for new activity 
content, structure, and governance are provided in Appendix B. Business model innovation 
aims at improving the relative competitive position of a platform’s business model through 
generating new user segments or through expanding the existing user base. Business model 
imitation, in contrast, matches changes in a rival’s business model in order to defend or 
enhance the relative competitive position of a focal platform’s business model. Thus, 
business model imitation is used to achieve legitimacy through mimetic isomorphism. 
Next, we used established coding techniques – the case dynamics matrix and causal 
chains of Miles et al. (2013) – to capture coherence between the innovations and imitations in 
each case over the years. The data analysis focused on the business model changes as units of 
analysis, exploring how and why innovations and imitations dynamically occurred or co-
occurred as patterns. In our analysis, two axes, business model design and entrepreneurial 
action (innovation and/or imitation) emerged inductively from the coding, which allowed us 
to categorize the dynamic combinations of innovations and imitations and their effect on 
business model design into different types. Two of the authors constantly compared, 
discussed, and refined the categorization during this process. The categorization was repeated 
in each case and compared across cases, until we identified four business model evolution 
patterns that continuously shaped and developed platforms (see Appendix C for further 
details). 
As the analysis continued, it became clear that there was variation across cases in terms 
of how they engaged with the four patterns. To capture this variation in a more fine-grained 
manner, in the final stage of coding, we investigated how the cases employed different 
business model patterns (i.e., the strategies to compete in platform battles) and whether these 
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different strategies of business model design were associated with platform survival or death. 
We grouped the twelve OGB companies into four categories (market leading, surviving, 
barely surviving, and failed) according to their sales growth and market share by the end of 
2013. Taking Case C as an example, once the leader in the market, Case C lost 50% of its 
market share within just two years, while Case A, a fierce competitor, increased its market 
share from 8% in 2010 to 42% in 2013. We, therefore, classified Case A as a successful 
platform and Case C as a failed platform.  
Sales growth and market share were adopted as the indicators of platform performance 
in this study for three reasons. First, the initial market characteristics, e.g., low entry barriers 
and low switching costs, pushed OGB platforms into considering survival as the most 
pressing need at this early stage of the industry cycle. The interviewees revealed that growing 
the user base and scaling the business model were key to their survival at this stage. Those 
OGB platforms that were able to grow the user base, and thus increase sales and market share, 
introduced changes to their activity system but these changes also generated costs, which 
made it difficult to gain profit at this early stage. As explained by the interviewees: “We 
didn’t consider profit as the priority” (Co-founder, Case A), and “if we would consider 
making profit every time we make a [competitive] move, we wouldn’t be moving” (Co-
founder, Case C). Second, the OGB platforms considered short-term financial losses to be 
acceptable because they expected that rivals would eventually exit when they could not scale 
fast enough. The companies made the assumption that the market would tip in favour of the 
leading company, and they expected to increase unit price and reduce subsidies after 
achieving a leading position in the long-term. Third, the literature on new ventures in general 
(e.g., Chandler and Hanks, 1993; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman, 1990; Short, 
McKelvie, Ketchen and Chandler, 2009) has suggested sales growth as an acceptable 
performance measure. Moreover, the strategy literature on firm performance in fast-changing 
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environments in general (e.g., Wilden et al., 2013), and in the context of high-growth firms in 
particular (e.g., Demir et al., 2017), often relies on sales growth as a performance measure. 
Besides sales growth and market share, we further considered the survival and exit of firms 
from the market. Cases K and L left the OGB industry in 2013 and 2012 respectively. The 
founder of Case C left in 2013 and it ceased trading by 2014 when the interviews took place, 
marking its failure in the OGB market.  
We then compared the adoptions of business model evolution patterns in each group, 
analyzing how the market leaders achieved superior performance by applying certain patterns 
and exploring why the rest of the companies were less successful, either because patterns 
were absent, or they applied the patterns wrongly. At this stage of the coding process, we not 
only relied on how often each pattern occurred, but also used the interviewees’ narratives to 
understand firms’ preferences towards the patterns. Accordingly, we explored what patterns 
dominated in the process of competition and what patterns were the key reasons for the 
success/failure of the cases (see Appendix D for illustrative quotes). During this process, two 
of the authors moved back and forth to review and consolidate the coding and classifications 
until a strong agreement was achieved. By design, inter-rater agreement at the final stage was 
100 percent. 
 
FINDINGS 
This section is organized as follows. First, we introduce the four patterns of business model 
evolution that emerged as being particularly salient across cases. Second, we describe how 
and why these patterns varied across cases, i.e., exploring the strategies to design multi-sided 
platform business models in a context of intense rivalry. We further discuss the outcomes of 
these efforts (measured by sales growth and market share), explaining how the different 
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strategies for the design of multi-sided platform business models in this market led to the 
success or failure of platforms. 
 
Patterns of Multi-sided Platform Business Model Evolution 
Our data revealed that OGB companies engage in innovations to develop their business 
models but also frequently respond to rivals’ innovations through imitation. These dynamic 
interactions between innovation and imitation can be theoretically distinguished, depending 
on a structural factor in business model design (complexity/simplicity) and the 
entrepreneurial actions of a platform firm to develop the business model (imitation/ 
innovation). Complexity in business model design refers to the number of design elements 
and the interactions among those elements, while entrepreneurial action explains whether a 
multi-sided platform relies on business model innovation or imitation when changing one or 
more design elements in the business model. Here, our analysis inductively suggested four 
patterns of business model evolution: simple innovation, complex innovation, simple 
imitation, and complex imitation (quadrants I to IV in Figure 3; see also Appendix C for 
illustrative quotes). 
Simple innovation. Simple innovation refers to a pattern whereby a focal platform firm 
introduces, occasionally or infrequently, innovations that are only loosely coupled to other 
innovations (and imitations) in its business model. Simple innovations involve creating a 
small number of novel design elements, e.g., Case C opened several offline stores as a 
promotion channel and to manage customer relationships. This choice was easily added to the 
existing business model design, as it did not require the firm to create complex 
interdependencies with existing components. 
Multi-sided platforms may also introduce innovations that would have normally 
required a number of interdependent changes in the existing business model, but they treated 
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the innovation as a new business that was subsequently spun off from the OGB business. As 
a consequence of this decision, the spin-offs did not enjoy the necessary support to grow into 
a sustainable business model component. Taking Case C again as an example, it formed a 
project team to develop a mobile payment system, hoping to use the system in its own app 
and lease it to third parties. However, this innovation was abandoned after seven months in 
favor of scaling its business model through acquiring several small OGB firms. Since the 
mobile payment system had only a limited relation with Case C’s core business, the company 
failed to devote substantial resources to the innovation. As the co-founder of Case C 
explained: 
“There were a lot of uncertainties with the experiment and it was not like we cannot live 
without it. So, we did not bet all our efforts and resources on it. That is why only a project 
team was doing the research and development.” 
In other cases, the platform firms introduced a core innovation but did not add highly 
interactive design elements to develop the innovation further. For example, Case L entered 
the OGB market by introducing the concept of an OGB aggregator platform. Instead of 
managing relationships with merchants, this innovation enabled L to select deals across 
several OGB websites and, thus, increased the variety of deals for consumers. Because of this 
innovation, L no longer needed to maintain or manage relationships with merchants but rather 
collected existing deals from OGB websites. Consequently, the business model of L became 
cost-driven. However, the innovation stayed simple as L added only two design elements 
over a three-year period. 
Complex innovation. Complex innovation refers to a pattern in which a platform 
creates complex interdependencies between a large number of design elements by engaging 
in on-going innovations within its own business model. However, a business model 
innovation that enables a firm to gain an advantage over its rivals also encourages imitation, 
so, to stay ahead of the competition, the innovator may decide to continue developing its new 
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business model through a series of innovations. Thus, by the time rivals have successfully 
imitated an innovator’s new activity system, the innovator may have made further changes to 
its business model, thereby shifting its focus from novelty towards reliability. 
In other instances, a platform may first engage in a series of changes and, during this 
process, discover an opportunity to generate new customer segments that it seizes by altering 
its business model. As an example, through a series of innovations (July 2010 to September 
2013), Case B extended its business model and moved from simply offering deals to 
generating a large amount of data from consumer reviews. Consumers provided these reviews 
to comment on deals and services offered by local merchants. For instance, B collected data 
on the popularity of different merchants in a particular area. Because of this enormous data 
resource, B was approached by Apple in October 2012 to collaborate in the development of 
the Chinese version of Siri, a program that enables conversational interaction between users 
and their smartphones. Collaborating with Apple in the development of Siri, “offered 
valuable experiences” (co-founder Case B) that resulted in the subsequent development of 
innovations. Eventually, Case B created a two-way flow of traffic with Internet firms by 
providing “big data” to the firms and collaborating to create value-added services, which 
greatly expanded the platform and industry boundaries. During this process, nine innovations 
were carried out by B over a three-year period, where the new design elements were highly 
interactive with one another and tightly linked to shape the evolution of its platform business 
model. 
Simple imitation. This refers to a pattern in which a platform observes a rival’s 
business model and selects and copies the most imitable design elements into its own 
business model. Such imitations often require only minor changes in the imitator’s business 
model. There is, therefore, a low level of interaction between the imitated design element and 
the existing components of the business model. The co-founder of Case G explained that 
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innovations from first movers often become an industry standard that subsequently attracted 
imitation. For example, when Case A changed the revenue side of its business model by 
introducing a refund policy, seven out of the twelve cases in our sample copied this 
innovation because they “were afraid of being left out”, according to Case G. Besides 
adopting industry standards, platforms following this pattern primarily imitated rivals’ 
business model innovations that were relatively easy to understand and did not require a lot 
of effort to integrate them into the existing business model. When A, for example, introduced 
a customer relationship management (CRM) system to its business model in February 2011, 
Case F, G and J copied this innovation as it was relatively easy to understand how activities 
in this system, e.g., tracking the transaction history of consumers and recommending deals 
according to their preferences, create value for the customer and the platform firm as well as 
its role in improving customer experience. According to Case J, “the CRM system was 
crucial to managing customer relationships. When the deals become more diversified, we 
need to know what type of deals each customer segment is interested in.” 
Complex imitation. The final pattern we identified is complex imitation, which begins 
with imitating a rival’s innovation, but successively develops the imitation through 
innovation. In contrast to simple imitation, this pattern shows a higher demand for integrating 
a number of design elements into the imitator’s business model because the process of 
adaptation created new linkages among activities, introduced new activity governance, or 
incrementally changed the content of other activities that complemented the adapted 
imitation. In this pattern, firms tended to invest heavily in the collection of intelligence about 
competitors as well as into activities that increased understanding of the interconnections 
between elements of their own business model. This enabled platforms to copy more complex 
parts of a rival’s business model. For instance, in November 2011, Case I imitated Case D’s 
mobile app which facilitated the promotion of deals depending on the location of a consumer. 
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Combining this with social media services enabled Case I to greatly extend its original 
functions. This combination offered significant advantages (e.g., for friends in the same area, 
the app may recommend deals for “cool bars”; for couples, deals from “romantic restaurants” 
etc.). As Case I explained, because of this adaptive imitation, social networks and location-
based services became the “key to the business model”. 
 
Strategies to Compete in Platform Battles 
In this section, we explore the contribution of the observed patterns for developing 
platform business models and discuss how and why the platforms compete through applying 
the patterns (summarized in Table 3). While we observed that platforms can use several 
patterns in the business model design process, not all patterns mattered for the growth of the 
platform businesses. The focus is, therefore, on what pattern(s) dominate actions aiming at 
creating competitive advantage within and across cases (see Appendix D). Our analysis 
reveals that the case firms used four strategies some of which combined the patterns 
identified in the previous section, while others focused on a particular pattern to achieve 
competitive advantage to compete in the market. Figure 3 shows the position of the four 
strategies within the matrix of the four evolution patterns. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 AND TABLE 3 HERE 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Innovation-centred strategy to create simple business model designs. Case C was 
highly innovative between 2010 and early 2012 by focusing on simple innovations (fourteen 
simple innovations). Cases K and L, in contrast, developed business models around a core 
innovation in their early platform stage but soon stopped developing the business model 
further. Although Cases C, K, and L all showed a high level of innovativeness, their business 
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models were relatively simple in the sense that there was a lack of design elements and/or the 
interdependencies between the design elements were rather fragile. Subsequently, Case C, K, 
and L all failed and left the OGB market. 
C mostly introduced innovations that were essentially experiments, with little or no 
relation to its existing business model. Their outcomes were unpredictable, and they were 
relatively easy to abandon, as their strategic relatedness to other components of the business 
model were rather weak. Case C abandoned nine out of fourteen innovations, which 
consumed time and resources in the short-term. Besides these failed innovations, the 
frequency with which C introduced these changes to its business model had a negative impact 
on its competitiveness. For example, while C introduced four innovations between December 
2011 and February 2012, Case A took advantage of C’s distraction with these “random” (co-
founder of C) experiments and replaced C as the market leader. By this time, C essentially no 
longer had a vision of its platform evolution and stopped its development for a period of nine 
months. In that time, C lost market share to B, D, and E (see also Figure 2). Case C 
completely shifted its focus to imitation in late 2013, which did not, however, aid recovery. 
Eventually, Case C stopped developing new deals by 2014, which marked its failure in the 
Chinese OGB market. 
Cases K and L were satisfied with the status quo and stopped further development of 
their platform business models. Although their core innovations improved short-term 
competitiveness, the simplicity of their business models made the firms vulnerable when 
facing competition from rivals with a deep resource base and strong competencies. 
Eventually, both firms left the OGB market. 
These companies typically did not respond to competitors’ business model 
development during the evolution process, mainly because they were blinded by their 
temporary competitive advantage as the result of certain innovations. For example, although 
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L did recognize that its business model innovation was imitated and further developed by 
others, the founder of the company did not see any need to react to imitators: “We were 
completely confident about our business model; we felt no changes were required”. Only 
after Case F (a business unit of a well-known Chinese Internet company) entered the market 
with an imitation of L’s business model, did L begin to recognize the market process of 
competition. While L was shocked that competition “suddenly became so aggressive”, F 
assessed the situation quite differently “[competition] was never something that happened 
suddenly”. 
Similarly, Case C was the first to introduce social, location, and mobile (SOLOMO) 
related innovations to its OGB business model. However, when Case C ran into problems 
with creating interdependencies between the elements, it abandoned these social components 
in favour of focusing on scaling the business model. C did not notice that competitors, such 
as Case D, had started imitating their business model. However, asked in the interview about 
this, the co-founder of Case C noted that a look at competitors “might have provided potential 
solutions to the issues” in developing the SOLOMO innovation. While Case C gave up its 
business model development, Case D eventually completed its SOLOMO-centred business 
model and outperformed Case C. The founder of C reflected: “I don’t know why we did not 
notice Case D. Possibly because we overlooked most competitors at that time; we were the 
largest, the richest, the most innovative, the leader, you know, all that halo.” 
Imitation-centred strategy to create simple business model designs. At the other end 
of the spectrum, Cases F, G, and J relied mostly on simple imitations in developing their 
platform business models. Reflected in interviewees’ comments, imitation is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. It requires monitoring a rival’s activity system, identifying 
design elements to copy (often precisely) and integrating them into the imitator’s business 
model. As elaborated by the founder of Case F: 
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“I do not understand why people have so many negative feelings about imitation. Being 
ashamed about imitation is like being ashamed about tracking the development of the 
industry […] Why is introducing a similar activity as a defence wrong? In fact, innovation is 
linked to a firm’s ability to collect information from competitors and learn from existing 
businesses to a large extent. Competitors can help us to innovate. If you don’t extensively 
observe, disassemble, and ‘reverse engineer’ a competitor’s business model, you will never 
know how the business model can be improved further. I mean, you will never know what 
works in the business model and what doesn’t.” 
Indeed, copying the right element may have an immediate positive impact on 
performance as companies often imitate proven or validated elements from a rival’s business 
model. In other words, copying may save time and deliver quick results. For example, Case G 
strengthened consumer relationships by copying an activity to provide refunds to consumers. 
However, imitators may only be able to evaluate a specific component or part of a 
competitor’s activity system and may overlook the bigger picture: they often copied only 
what they could easily understand, instead of imitating an interdependent, more complex, set 
of design elements. For example, while Cases F, G, and J copied the simplest component (the 
CRM system), Case A continued to innovate around its CRM system (e.g., by adding 
merchant services and deal development systems) to improve the overall efficiency of its 
business model. Introducing additional activity content generated virtuous cycles, or feedback 
loops, that strengthened the interconnection between the CRM system and other components 
of A’s IT infrastructure. Cases F, G and J did not copy subsequent innovations because they 
were not able to see the value of the interconnections between activity content and structure 
that A strengthened in several iterations. Even when imitators recognized the value of a 
complex innovation, they often faced resource constraints and a lack of competencies: some 
platforms did not, or were not willing to, invest in the integration of complex innovations into 
their activity system (or develop imitations further). For example, when the founder of Case J 
was asked why J stopped developing the CRM system further, he explained: “It was not that 
we didn’t want to. We were afraid of losing customers but we did not have enough money, 
people, or even time to do that. It was just not an option for us.” 
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Without continuously developing design elements, the positive effect of the imitations 
quickly faded in the long-run, which explains why the sales performance of the imitators 
often fluctuated. For example, the founder of Case F explained: 
“When we first copied (the movie ticket-related) services (the simple element in a complex 
innovation introduced by Case A), sales were great [...] but it did not last long [...] because 
while Case A created a multi-flow traffic between its tightly linked segments (restaurants, 
movies, hotels, and food-delivery) within its business model, we did not have the other 
segments to bring traffic to our movie segment”. 
Platforms that used this strategy, therefore, barely survived, with sales fluctuating 
between CN¥10 million (approx. US$1.5 million) and CN¥100 million (approx. US$15 
million). 
Imitation-centred strategy to create complex business model designs. Cases D and E, 
as late entrants in the OGB market, overtook Case C through a combination of simple and 
complex imitations. A typical characteristic of D and E was a strong ability to make sense of 
how specific design elements in a rival’s business model contributed to sales and a strong 
ability to decompose and modularize their own business model to embrace the new design 
elements. While simple imitations delivered quick results, complex imitations, i.e., the 
subsequent adaptation of an imitation, facilitated the integration of the imitation into an 
activity system, eventually contributing to long-term sales by providing an opportunity to 
catch up with competitors. For example, Case D copied C’s abandoned innovation, the 
SOLOMO activity system, without fully understanding it at first, but mastered the imitation 
during the adaptation process, eventually achieving what C originally intended to accomplish. 
An industry expert commented: 
“It is interesting. Nowadays, when people talk about the SOLOMO system, they always 
give credit to Case D. However, it (Case D) initially did not even understand the location-
based services it imitated from Case C […] Yet, (while adapting the innovation) Case D did a 
much better job and mastered it in this sense.” 
Although they survived in this highly competitive market, Cases D and E were not able 
to catch-up with the market leaders. These platform firms displayed a lack of “forward 
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thinking” (co-founder, Case E) and innovativeness. For example, the co-founder of Case D 
explained that D did not understand the SOLOMO business model in the beginning and they 
“just happened to have the social media platform that allowed us to add check-ins (to a 
nearby shop)” (the parent company was a social media Internet firm). The co-founders of 
both D and E showed a deep understanding of their competitors’ business models and the 
design elements that could be leveraged into their own business models but were not able to 
proactively introduce innovations to fundamentally challenge the logic of value creation and 
capture. 
Furthermore, the adaptation of design elements is difficult and time consuming and the 
positive impact of adaptive imitation is subject to the required speed of integrating the 
elements into the business model. In contrast to D and E, Cases H and I took a relatively long 
time to adapt imitations into their business models. While Case D completed its SOLOMO 
business model in 2012, Case I eventually designed the social media app based on social 
interactions and location-based services by the end of 2013. By the time Case I had gone 
through the long process of configuring and reconfiguring its business model, D had already 
established a strong position in the market. Consequently, Case I struggled to develop its 
business model further. As the founder of Case I explained: 
“We have come such a long way to develop the business model […] as a small 
company, sometimes we cannot go as fast as the big firms. We must take one step at a time. 
This is frustrating because we always are at risk of missing the (right) time for introducing 
the innovations. And sometimes, speed means everything in this market.” 
Hybrid strategy to create complex business model designs. By December 2013, with 
monthly sales of CN¥2.1 billion (approx. US$324 million) and a market share of 48.8%, Case 
A was the most successful company in the Chinese OGB market. Case B closely followed 
with a market share of 26.2%. Cases A and B are, therefore, illustrations of firms that 
successfully developed multi-sided platform business models in this competitive 
environment. 
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Cases A and B combined innovations and imitations to create complex and strong 
interdependencies between business model elements. This combination is associated with a 
high level of internal disruption and requires full awareness of components, linkages, and 
dynamics in business models, i.e., how the design elements come together to reinforce the 
firm’s unique competitive position. Case A segmented consumer demands and created four 
business units (movie, hotel, restaurant, and food delivery), e.g., the movie unit integrated 
new offerings such as ticket deals, seat selection, ticket collection, movie rating, and fan 
communities in a specialized app. These activities interacted with each other through four 
digital systems (CRM, deal development and control, merchant services, and online payment 
systems) that formed the digital infrastructure of Case A. By the end of 2013, Case A was 
recognized as a “unicorn” start-up in local services, where “A is the only name customers 
have in mind when they think about these things, whether seeking eating, drinking, traveling, 
or entertainment” (co-founder, Case A). 
From its founding, Case B engaged in innovations and imitations to build its business 
model around the collection, analysis, and application of “big data”. A series of innovations 
and imitations enabled B, over time, to create complex interdependencies between activity 
content, structure, and governance. By 2013, B had an industry-wide reputation for creating 
and capturing value with the management of “big data”. During this process, B created 
interdependencies between design elements, and it also formed a complex system of coherent 
and mutually reinforcing activities. This turned out to be critical when their business model 
was constantly undergoing change. According to the interviewees, matching and integrating 
design elements was important to ensure coherence and consistency within their firm’s 
business model. Once such a complex system is formed and continuously evolved, it may 
provide a competitive advantage. The co-founder of Case A explained: 
“It is unnecessary to monitor how many competitors have copied it (the CRM system), 
because basically we cannot control imitations. The key is to keep moving. When all OGB 
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companies developed the CRM system, we had the merchant service system. When they 
copied the merchant service system, we had other systems ready to use. The competitors 
cannot copy all our systems, and even if they could, they would be too late because these 
system developments take time.” 
The co-founder of Case D confirmed this assessment: “We knew that Case A created 
the CRM system which we imitated. We even did a better job. However, God knows what 
other systems they were developing at the same time.”  
A focus on the potentially high level of internal disruption that may result from the 
adoption of changes that affect other parts of the business model does not imply that A and B 
did not observe their competitors too. In fact, novelty in their business model design was 
complemented by their willingness and ability to develop intelligence concerning how and 
why rivals create value with their platforms. This monitoring supported the firms in taking 
the complexity of their platform business models to the next level. For example, Cases A and 
B both copied location-based services from C and further integrated the services with their 
own innovations. The co-founder of Case A explained: 
“As for the question whether innovation is important or not, I think that satisfying customer 
demand is important, because if you develop a new offering that is not accepted in the 
market, then it is useless [...] I always think it does not matter if it is new, what matters is 
whether it is useful, that is, if customers have a demand for it. Does this idea come from the 
competitors or us? As long as it works, why does it matter?” 
Using advanced data analytics, Case A even invented a sophisticated monitoring 
system that enabled it to systematically study the business models of key competitors. This 
system alerts Case A’s senior management team to unusual traffic and patterns on rivals’ 
websites, eventually enabling A to respond quickly to a rival’s innovation. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This article opened with questions regarding the evolution of multi-sided platform business 
models in a context of fierce competition. Specifically, we asked how can we describe and 
analyze interconnected and interdependent decisions in the development of multi-sided 
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platform designs, and how some multi-sided platforms succeed in the competitive battle for 
market leadership, while many more perish? The answers, based on the observation and 
analysis of rich, longitudinal data from twelve multi-sided platform firms in the Chinese 
OGB market, lie in the patterns of platform business model development and the different 
strategies for applying (and combining) those patterns. In the following section, we discuss 
how our findings contribute to the platform literature and how they can facilitate future 
theorizing and empirical research. We conclude with practical implications. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
Our study has several implications for scholarship on multi-sided platforms. First, our 
study is the first to show that the business model, as a source of value creation and 
appropriation (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Teece, 2010), is a useful level of analysis to explore competition in multi-sided platform 
markets. While prior platform research has advanced several explanations for platform 
success in nascent markets (Cusumano et al., 2019; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Parker et al., 
2016), the business model, as a key imperative was thus far left unexplored. Grounded on the 
concepts established by prior theorizing (e.g., Amit and Zott, 2001; Zott and Amit, 2007; 
2008), we began our discussion by conceptualizing a multi-sided platform business model as 
a system of interdependent activities that transcends a focal platform firm and spans it 
boundaries. The activity system describes how the platform firm taps into the ecosystem of 
producers and users, and it enables the platform firm, in concert with two or more distinct 
types of platform participants, to create value and also to capture and monetize a share of that 
value. This is why multi-sided platform business models, while anchored on a particular 
platform firm, are ecosystem-centric in their design. The specific parameters we considered 
to analyze the overall organizational gestalt of multi-sided platforms are the design elements 
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of activity content, structure, and governance (Zott and Amit, 2010). While prior platform 
research has extensively considered the role of individual design parameters in creating 
successful platform businesses (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Parker et al., 2016), and, to 
a lesser extent, how a specific choice related to one side of a platform has consequences for 
another side (e.g., Zhu and Iansiti, 2012), much less attention has been given to the question 
how choices interact and, consequently, how the system as a whole evolves over time. 
Studying how the activity systems of twelve multi-sided platforms in the Chinese OGB 
market evolved over a business cycle enabled us to address this gap and link system design 
with platform performance. For example, introducing a CRM system allowed Case A to 
generate deep customer insights, which opened several new business opportunities. The CRM 
system became critical for value creation because it allowed Case A to build relationships and 
to improve user experience, thereby retaining users as business model participants. For 
example, on the merchant side, the insights that Case A generated through this system 
enabled it to add new services to its platform, which attracted merchants to keep coming 
back: Case A locked merchants in. On the consumer side, Case A made an effort to create a 
more personalized and complete consumer experience (e.g., covering more aspects of a 
consumer’s life), which strengthened its reputation and loyalty among consumers. This lock-
in made it less likely that consumers would use multiple OGB platforms at the same time for 
the same purpose. Besides limiting multi-homing, the CRM system had another advantage: 
user relationships became a difficult-to-imitate element in its business model, eventually 
enabling Case A to thrive despite a seemingly weak appropriability regime. Moreover, the 
CRM system was, over time, integrated with other design elements (e.g., deal development, 
online payment system). Interdependencies between the elements generated positive 
feedback-loops in the business model, which further increased the total value created for all 
platform partners and allowed Case A to capture a greater share of the value. These findings 
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allow us to establish the business model as a new determinant of platform performance, 
suggesting that the business model, as the architecture of activities, is indeed a useful 
construct in platform research. 
By extending the prior business model literature into a platform context, our study may 
inspire new research on how platform business models evolve over time. Future platform 
research could, for instance, integrate the information systems and business model literatures 
to explore the interplay of choices concerning the technology architecture (i.e., decisions 
concerning a key resource underlying the activity system) and design choices in a platform 
business model, and how those interactions shape the evolutionary dynamics of platforms. 
For example, the choice of Case B to build its business model around “big data” suggests that 
the choice of technological architecture may have consequences for the design of a platform 
business model (and vice versa). An area of future research, therefore, may involve the 
dynamic interplay of choices and consequences concerning digital technologies and multi-
sided platform business model. What is the effect of a platform’s technological architecture 
on the relationship between business model design and platform success (or failure)? 
Second, after theoretically grounding our analysis in the activity system perspective, we 
moved beyond prior work by generating insights into the mechanisms that enable the 
evolution of a multi-sided platform’s activity system over time in a context of fierce rivalry. 
Specifically, studying what a multi-sided platform firm does when it competes with specific 
rival platforms, we identify two principle competitive behaviors, namely business model 
innovation (Amit and Zott, 2012; Hacklin et al., 2018; Snihur and Wiklund, 2019; von Delft 
et al., 2018) and business model imitation (Amit and Zott, 2015; Casadesus-Masanell and 
Zhu, 2013; Frankenberger and Stam, 2019), and show that both innovative actions and 
imitative reactions are commonplace in crafting a viable multi-sided platform business model 
in the competitive context of the OGB industry. Business model innovation enabled some of 
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the OGB platforms to challenge the dominant logic of value creation and capture in the 
market, and significantly enhanced their platform’s relative competitive position. However, 
successful business model innovations promote rapid imitations that may also be used as an 
effective means of differentiating and enhancing a platform firm’s relative competitive 
position. For example, Cases D and E used business model imitation to surpass market leader 
Case C, which, at the time, had the largest installed user base and was widely considered as 
the most innovative company in the market. However, as our findings further show, while 
copying a rival’s business model innovation is a realistic strategy that can yield successful 
outcomes, imitation is not always simple: copying a rival’s platform business model (in full 
or in part) requires a great deal of insight into the complex relations between the various 
elements of a rival’s business model. Furthermore, while a group of platform firms in our 
sample displayed a strong ability to imitate design elements from rivals’ business models, and 
even further adapt and integrate them, these advanced imitators still failed in the market. 
Neither platforms that focused all their efforts on business model imitation nor platforms that 
committed to business model innovation survived in the long run. In contrast, the market 
leaders that emerged from intensive competitive battles used business model imitation and 
innovation simultaneously, suggesting that successful multi-sided platforms excel at copying 
from rivals to defend or enhance their relative competitive position and at creating new sets 
of activities to generate new or expand existing user bases. Empirically studying the 
engagement between platform firms highlight the importance of competitors in the process of 
creating and growing platform business models and thus complements prior platform 
research that has focused on other stakeholders such as complementors (e.g., Adner, 2017; 
Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Eisenmann et al., 2011; Kapoor and 
Agarwal, 2017; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). 
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The principal mechanisms for developing platform business models identified in our 
study open new avenues for further inquiry. To facilitate theory building, future platform 
research could, for example, explore the underlying drivers that motivate multi-sided 
platforms to undertake hybrids of innovation and imitation. This behavioral stream of 
research could also take into account the effects of previous motives and feedback from 
earlier platform performance. The identified hybrid strategy provides a starting point, but 
future research is needed to fully understand and unpack the process behind the successful 
hybrid strategy that we discovered.  
Third, focusing on changes in the architecture of a platform’s activity system, described 
by design elements (content, structure, and governance), our research reports that the number 
of design elements and level of interdependence between them has a critical influence on 
platform performance. Successful platform firms create highly interdependent activity 
systems with a large number of design elements, and the sheer complexity of an activity 
system can itself constitute a barrier to imitation. Here, we claim to extend prior organization 
literature (e.g., Rivkin, 2000; Siggelkow, 2002, 2011) to platform business models to 
generate plausible, conjecturable explanations for platform success and failure: complexity 
became a key dimension in our categorization of business model designs (see Figure 3), 
where high complexity denoted recognition of the linkages between individual ingredients of 
change and the platform’s entire business model or those of competitors (Sorenson et al., 
2016). Successful Cases A and B were located exclusively within this complexity category 
and became market leaders. Simplicity was associated with failure and mere survival. 
The introduction of complexity to the platform literature provides a starting point for 
several avenues for future empirical research. Future research could, for instance, explore the 
nature of design elements and their interaction in more detail to further enhance 
understanding of the role of complexity in the evolution of multi-sided platform business 
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models. Do all design elements interact equally? If not, what elements are more central or 
core to a platform business model and which ones are more peripheral, and how does the 
number and identity of design elements influence platform performance over time? 
Moreover, future research could further test and refine the proposed link between complexity 
and platform success. We have argued that complexity can provide a basis for competitive 
advantage in platform battles, but is it possible that complexity may become a burden at later 
stages of the evolution cycle? For example, the extant business model literature (Christensen 
et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2008) suggests that interdependencies between business model 
elements are well-established at later stages of development, but also generate more 
resistance to change. Similarly, prior organization literature suggests that tightly coupled 
systems, or configurations, might limit a firm’s ability to react to environmental changes 
(Levinthal, 1997; Siggelkow, 2001). Considering these observations, is complexity always 
advantageous? If not, when in the developmental process, and under what conditions, can 
complexity be a disadvantage for platform firms?  
In relation to platform success, future research that focuses on a mature stage of an 
industry cycle, might also consider profits when studying the performance of platforms. From 
a business model perspective, in the early stages of the industry cycle, the OGB platforms 
searched for a scalable business model (using business model innovation and imitation). The 
key design principle was to stay competitive and secure a market position, even at the 
expense of profitability. The companies expected that the market would tip in favour of the 
leading company. A long-run situation developed whereby, echoing Noe and Parker (2005, p. 
142), “…profitability is confined to a very small number of Internet winners”. The platforms 
also expected to increase profit margin after achieving a leading position in the long-term that 
would allow firms to “…gain significant market power and extract most of the value” 
(Cusumano et al., 2019, p. 145). However, “market share winners will have to pay back 
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investors eventually” (Cusumano et al., 2019, p. 136) and it is thus reasonable to suggest that 
at some stage the leading OGB platforms will have to find a business model that makes 
profits. Therefore, it seems likely that at a later stage of the industry cycle, platforms need to 
move from the exploration phase (i.e., the discovery and implementation of a scalable 
business model that takes advantage of network effects) toward the exploitation phase (i.e., 
the introduction of changes to the business model that make it more efficient and profitable). 
In our study, Cases A and B were able to achieve a leading market position, thus creating 
competitive advantage. Whether this competitive advantage is sustainable or not remains to 
be seen. Future research should therefore explore how the business model of the leading 
platforms evolves in the next phase of the industry cycle and beyond.   
Research on the later stages of the industry cycle could also explore if changes in the 
nature of consumer demand (e.g., away from preferring a wide variety of deals, as we 
observed, towards a preference for more specialized offerings) may force the few remaining 
platforms to re-think their platform strategies, and to possibly focus on niches. Alternatively, 
platforms may have the opportunity to combine product and platform features (as Amazon 
did), eventually growing even bigger and enjoying economies of scale – a situation that may, 
in the limit, even result in a winner-take-all outcome.   
Another stream of future research could consider alternative explanations of 
heterogeneity in platform performance alongside the role of the business model proposed in 
our study. For example, building on our exploratory, qualitative study, future explanatory, 
quantitative research could explore how much the business model matters for platform 
performance relative to more established concepts (choice of market/industry, competitive 
strategy etc.) proposed in prior platform research (e.g., Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; 
Cusumano et al., 2019; Hagiu, 2014; Parker et al., 2016).  
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Finally, case study research must always confront the issue of generalizability, but also 
the possibility that its limitations may represent research opportunities. Our study investigates 
twelve cases, one industry, and one country in a world where platform business models vary 
enormously, and our conclusions must of course therefore remain tentative. However, our 
deep, yet necessarily narrow, focus may have wider implications, and future research may 
identify the boundary conditions for our findings. Many platforms build around a 
technological core (e.g., Apple iOS, Google Android) would seem to share many 
characteristics of our OGB platforms, i.e., digitally-enabled platforms featuring multi-
sidedness, interactive ecosystems, and transparency, but differ in terms of what value is 
exchanged, how they bring together platform participants, and for what purpose. Using 
economies of scale as a distinctive feature, Hagiu (2014, p. 80), reminds us that not all 
platforms are the same: “many, but not all, multi-sided platforms exhibit economies of scale.” 
The OGB industry is a setting where – in comparison to other platform markets – the average 
costs of serving a user do not radically decline with a growing number of users. While many 
platforms have low or zero marginal costs when adding users, the OGB firms need to incur 
significant current costs, e.g. hire more support staff when the number of merchants they 
serve grows. Therefore, do our findings apply to other digitally-enabled platforms? Future 
research could also test if our findings apply in traditional industries such as energy or 
healthcare that are currently undergoing digital transformation, as platform firms begin to 
enter these industries (e.g., Uber partnered with Circulation to provide rides for patients to 
hospitals). 
 
Managerial Implications 
While many disrupting businesses are built on multi-sided platforms, not all multi-sided 
platform business models work equally well. In fact, most attempts at developing platform 
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business model fail or at best become enveloped by competitors. We set out to explore what 
determines the success of a multi-sided platform business model, and our analysis suggests 
three implications that entrepreneurs and managers tasked with designing a multi-sided 
platform business model may consider. First, successful platform designers think 
systemically and holistically about their business model; they generate interdependencies 
between the various elements of their business model and focus on the overall design, instead 
of optimizing single features or add-ons. Second, successful platform designers think about 
competition when designing their business model; they recognize that platform business 
models do not operate in a vacuum and consider how their model interacts with those of 
rivals, using ever advancing data analytic tools. Third, platform leaders use both business 
model innovation and imitation to create complex business models; they generate a tightly 
coupled system in which various components bond with one another in complementary and 
consistent ways, and scale the model quickly. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 Development of the Chinese OGB (Online Group Buying) market between 
2010 and 2013 (data obtained from the statistics portal Tuan800). 
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FIGURE 2 Monthly sales of the twelve case companies between 2010 and 2013 (data 
obtained from the companies). 
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FIGURE 3 Matrix of approaches to platform evolution and strategies to compete in 
platform battles observed in the Chinese OGB market. 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of Different Types of Businesses 
 Pipeline business Manufacturing platform Multi-sided platform 
What is the role of 
the focal firm? 
Producer (operating in linear buyer-
supplier relationships) 
Producer (operating within a network of 
suppliers) 
Intermediary (enabling direct 
interactions between users) 
Who owns the 
product? 
Focal firm  
(change of ownership after sale) 
Focal firm  
(change of ownership after sale) Users 
How is value 
created? 
Through product features that deliver 
customer benefits 
Through product features (co-developed 
with a network of suppliers) that deliver 
customer benefits 
Through enabling and facilitating 
transactions 
How is value 
monetized? 
Charging money (e.g., asset sale, usage 
fee) for product features (single revenue 
stream) 
Charging money (e.g., asset sale, usage fee) 
for product features (single revenue stream) 
Often free for one user group; 
access or commission fee paid by 
other users/complementors 
(multiple revenue streams) 
What is the basis 
of competition? 
Product development 
Price 
Product development 
Price Business model development 
Examples McDonalds, Rolex, Stihl  Airbus, Boeing, VW Alibaba, Airbnb, Uber 
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TABLE 2 
Overview of the Cases and Collected Data 
Case 
Venture 
Foundation 
Date 
Ownership type 
Firm size1  
(At December 
2013) 
Total sales  
(From 2010 to 2013)/ 
in CN¥ billions) 
Market share  
(Based on sales at 
December 2013) 
Collected data2 
A 03/2010 Independent firm >5,500 21.99 48.8% 4 interviews  (6.5 hours)  695 pages 
B 06/2010 Independent firm >3,000 12.39 26.2% 4 interviews  (6.5 hours)  539 pages 
C 04/2010 Independent firm >2,500 7.64 7.0% 3 interviews  (6 hours)  685 pages 
D 06/2010 
Business unit of Chinese Internet 
company α (acquired by Chinese 
Internet company β in 2014) 
>1,500 6.64 6.9% 3 interviews  (5.5 hours)  565 pages 
E 09/2010 Independent firm >1,000 5.41 7.7% 3 interviews  (5.5 hours)  564 pages 
F 02/2011 Business unit of a Chinese Internet 
company γ 60 2.65 1.5% 
2 interviews  
(4 hours)  393 pages 
G 03/ 2011 
Joint venture between Groupon and 
a Chinese Internet company δ 
(shares acquired by δ in 2012) 
>1,000 1.45 0.5% 2 interviews  (4 hours)  457 pages 
H 06/2010 Independent firm 500 1.03 0.6% 3 interviews  (5.5 hours)  253 pages 
I 04/2010 Independent firm 40 0.89 0.3% 2 interviews  (5 hours)  278 pages 
J 10/2010 Independent firm 200 0.49 0.13% 2 interviews  (4 hours)  272 pages 
K 11/2010 Independent firm 03 (20 in 2011) 0.18 0 2 interviews  (3 hours)  188 pages 
L 04/2010 Independent firm 03 (15 in 2011) 0.08 0 1 interview  (2.5 hours)  145 pages 
1
 Firm size refers to the number of full-time employees in December 2013.  
2 The number of interviews over the two rounds of interviews. Number of pages includes both transcripts of primary and secondary data. 
3
 Cases K and L left the OGB market in 2013 and 2012 respectively. 
TABLE 3 
Strategies to Compete in Platform Battles and their Implications for Firm Performance 
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APPENDICES 
Cases Performance Strategy Basis of the strategy Implications of the strategy 
C 
K 
L 
Failed 
Innovation-
centered 
strategy to 
create simple 
business model 
designs 
• High level of innovativeness. 
• However, the focal firm typically did not respond 
to competitors’ business model designs, because it 
was “blinded” by the temporary competitive 
advantages given by simple innovations. 
• Simple innovations are easily abandoned due to their low 
strategic relatedness with other business model elements. 
A large number of simple innovations consume time and 
resources in the short-term and result in a loss of focus in 
the long-term. 
• Satisfaction with a simple innovation resulted in losing 
track of industry trends and accordingly failing to keep 
up with changes. 
F 
G 
J 
Barely 
Surviving 
Imitation-
centered 
strategy to 
create simple 
business model 
designs 
• Ability to monitor rival’s activity system and 
identify specific elements to copy. 
• However, constrained by a lack of resources 
and/or competencies, platforms using this strategy 
were not able to copy more complex sets of design 
elements. 
• Simple imitations saved time and delivered quick results 
in the short-term. Without continuous development of 
design elements, however, this positive effect, quickly 
faded in the long-term. Therefore, the sales performance 
of the imitators often fluctuated. 
D 
E 
(H 
I)1 
Surviving 
Imitation-
centered 
strategy to 
create complex 
business model 
designs 
• Strong ability to make sense of design elements in 
a rival’s business model and to decompose its own 
business model to embrace the new design 
elements. 
• However, platforms using this strategy were 
opportunistic, had a lack of “forward thinking”, 
and less disruptive. 
• Complex imitations provided an opportunity to catch up 
and even surpass competitors in the long-term. 
• The positive effect of complex imitations was subject to 
the speed of integration and reconfiguration (Case H and 
I)1. 
A 
B Market leading 
Hybrid strategy 
to create 
complex 
business model 
designs 
• A high level of internal disruption was 
complemented by the ability of developing 
intelligence about how rivals create value with 
their business models. 
• Full awareness of how the design elements come 
together to reinforce the platform’s unique 
position in the market. 
• The series of innovations and imitations formed a 
complex system of coherent and mutually reinforcing 
activities. 
• Once the complex activity system is formed, and 
continuously evolved, it provided a competitive 
advantage. 
1Cases H and I followed imitation-cantered strategy to create complex business model designs but they were barely surviving due to the slow speed of integration and reconfiguration. 
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Appendix A Groupon’s OGB Business Model. 
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Appendix B. Business Model Design Elements in Multi-Sided Platforms – Activity Content, Structure, and Governance 
Business model  
design elements Examples 
Platform participants 
affected by changes 
Simple 
business 
model 
design 
Activity content 
Operated the membership system, in which users paid membership fee to get 
deeper discounts. (Case A) Users 
Ran a new website named “E-mall”, whereby merchants paid a fixed fee to open 
their own e-shops. (Case C) Merchants 
Established a team that aimed to build a mobile payment app to include third 
party Internet companies in the business model. This new content was viewed as 
a “side project” (Co-founder, Case C) that was not linked to the existing 
business model. (Case C) 
Complementors 
Activity structure 
Integrated the social media channels of users, which enabled users to share deals 
on multiple social media platforms by clicking one button. (Case J) Users 
Established a feedback loop, providing integrated consumer reviews to 
merchants. This helped merchants improve services and design of deals. (Case 
D) 
Merchants 
 
Activity governance 
Cooperated with China Unicom to connect OGB accounts with mobile accounts. 
(Case B) Users 
An online travel agent provided hotel deals to Case G. (Case G) Merchants 
Baidu Ads Alliance ads posted on the homepage to earn traffic fees from Baidu 
(the largest search engine in China). (Case L) Complementors 
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Business model  
design elements Examples 
Platform participants 
affected by changes  
Complex 
business 
model 
design 
Activity content and 
structure 
Operated a CRM system, in which users could get refunds for the deals they did 
not use in store within a time limit. The refund was retained as a revenue stream 
in the original business model. Although the refunds depleted revenue, this 
action attracted large numbers of users and saved on advertising expenses. (Case 
A) 
Users 
Integrated social interactions with location-based services through the “check-
in” mobile site, social games, and a social interaction platform “Life”. Mapped 
deals according to location of merchants in the mobile app. (Case C) 
Users 
Operated a Merchant Service system, whereby merchants could claim payments 
once certain number of users used deals in the stores. In contrast to the fixed 
payment term (e.g., 3 months) in the original business model, the flexible 
payment to merchants expanded the merchant base. (Case A) 
Merchants 
Integrated OGB deals with other products including coupons, check-in, key 
words searching, digital membership card, and seat reservation, in a “total 
solution” that could be tailored to fit diversified demands of merchants. (Case B) 
Users and merchants 
On the one hand, Case I encouraged user interaction and generated big data 
through the deal sharing page, auction page, user blogs, and communities 
forming. On the other hand, Case I encouraged merchants to explore user 
demands (e.g., type of deals that are most attractive to users) on the basis of this 
big data. Merchants could launch deals on Case I’s website in response to user 
demands. (Case I) 
Users and merchants 
 
Promoted movie deals in an official movie account in WeChat (the largest social 
media platform in China). Upgraded the channel to sell movie tickets by 
combining social media marketing with mobile payment. (Case G) 
Users and complementors 
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Business model  
design elements Examples 
Platform participants 
affected by changes  
Complex 
business 
model 
design 
Activity structure 
and governance 
Case K designed products (e.g., clothes) and promoted them to users. 
Collaborating with a factory, when a certain number of users pre-ordered a 
product, Case K placed an order with the factory to manufacture it. (Case K) 
Users 
Created a merchant database that was opened to all OGB sites. Small and 
medium sized OGB firms who did not have their own databases could look for 
merchants in the database and co-develop deals that were promoted through 
Case I. (Case I) 
Merchants and 
complementors 
Case E was authorized to run the liquor business units of three e-commerce 
platforms. E provided a total solution to liquor suppliers, i.e., their products 
could be sold across the platforms. (Case E) 
Merchants and 
complementors 
Activity content, 
structure, and 
governance 
Ran four inter-related apps that were specialized in catering, movie, hotel, and 
take-away food delivery markets (activity content and structure). Collaborated 
with merchants and complementors (activity governance) in each segment to 
develop new activity content. (Case A) 
Users, merchants, and 
complementors 
Collaborated with shopping malls (activity governance), so that users could try 
on physical goods (e.g. clothes and shoes) in the malls and then order the goods 
through Case B to get discounts. This new activity content reversed the sequence 
of activities, enabling users to try products on before making purchases (activity 
structure). (Case B) 
Users and merchants 
Provide big data to Internet companies (activity governance) through a big data 
platform (activity content) and created two-way flows of traffic across firms 
(activity structure). (Case B) 
Users and Complementors 
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Business model 
design elements Examples 
Platform participants 
affected by changes  
Complex 
business 
model 
design 
Activity content, 
structure, and 
governance 
(continued) 
Involved local liquor stores and convenience stores in the business model 
(activity governance), developing an app (activity content) whereby users could 
order liquor from the stores according to the locations and the stores responsible 
for delivery. (Case E) 
Users and complementors 
Organized a strategic alliance between 200 small and medium sized OGB firms 
by facilitating communicative meetings and conferences, sharing industry 
information, providing IT training, and co-creating OGB deals (activity content 
and governance). Small and medium sized OGB firms had difficulties in 
attracting merchants providing premium services and products. Case F 
developed a good relationship with these merchants by leveraging the brand 
reputation of its parent company. OGB firms then took the job over and crafted 
deals with the merchants (activity structure and governance). The deals were 
promoted across the platforms of Case F and the small and medium sized OGB 
firms (activity structure). (Case F) 
Merchants and 
complementors 
Assisted merchants to open e-shops in WeChat shops (activity governance) and 
provide a marketing solution (OGB deals, coupons, search engine optimization, 
map-based promotions, etc.) to promote the e-shops, whereby merchants could 
choose and evaluate these marketing services in an IT system (activity content 
and structure). (Case H) 
Merchants and 
complementors 
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Appendix C. Illustrative Quotes of the Business Model Evolution Patterns 
Pattern 
Business model design Entrepreneurial action 
Implications for firm performance 
Simple Imitation 
Simple 
Imitation 
“This (embedding the promotion of deals in 
the parent company’s products) was a 
single action, possibly the only innovation 
that did benefit from the resources of the 
parent company.” (Founder, Case F) 
 
“Developing the goods deals (a simple 
imitation) aimed to complement the selling 
of local deals [...] selling the (good) deals 
was separated from the OGB business 
model. The OGB business model focuses on 
local services. Selling goods deals means 
that we will have to compete with Tmall 
and we will never win the war with Tmall. 
Therefore, it was only a single action to 
increase the margin in a short-term.” (Co-
founder, Case G) 
 
 
“We didn’t take a long time to study the 
innovation. It was relatively simple to 
introduce the same activity.” (Founder, 
Case J). 
 
“We have always tried to stay 
close to the top firms.” (Co-
founder, Case G) 
 
“It was not very complicated 
for us (to imitate) because 
basically the competitors 
guided us step by step.” 
(Founder, Case F). 
 
“The sales increased nearly 35% two months 
after the promotion (embedding the promotion 
of deals in the parent company’s products) 
was introduced.” (Founder, Case F) 
 
“Selling goods deals means that we will have 
to compete with Tmall and we will never win 
the war with Tmall. Therefore, it was only a 
single action to increase the margin in a 
short-term.” (Co-founder, Case G) 
 
While Case A built up the IT infrastructure 
through a complex innovation, Case J’s 
understanding of the IT infrastructure is 
limited to “the CRM system was crucial to 
manage the customer relationships.” 
(Founder, Case J). 
 
While Case A created a “no boundary” 
business model to expand into the movie, 
hotel, and food-delivery market through 
complex innovations, Case F’s understanding 
of the innovation is limited to “sales from the 
movie deals accounted for a large percentage 
in the total sales”. Consequently, the imitation 
of movie related service “did not provide a 
long-term competitive advantage” (Founder, 
Case F). 
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Pattern 
Business model design Entrepreneurial action 
Implication for firm performance 
Simple Innovation 
Simple 
Innovation 
“I had no other choice but to look for quick 
money to keep the site running. I am very 
familiar with Baidu Alliance ads. This (the 
innovation of integrating the Baidu 
Alliance ads into the homepage to generate 
traffic fees from Baidu) became my first 
choice. However, I know this was not a 
long-lasting move [...] because the Baidu 
alliance can hardly be linked to the core 
OGB business (model).” (Founder, Case L) 
 
“There were a lot of uncertainties with the 
experiment and it was not like we cannot 
live without it. So, we did not bet all the 
effort and resources on it. That is why only 
a project team was doing the research and 
development.” (Co-founder, Case C) 
 
 
“We were the first (OGB 
company) who tried to 
develop the mobile payment 
system” (Co-founder, Case 
C). 
 
“I invented the pre-order 
business model.” (Founder, 
Case K) 
“The innovation (Baidu Alliance ads) did not work out.” 
(Founder, Case L) 
 
“Now when I think about it, they (the simple innovations 
between late 2011 and early 2012) hardly brought any 
promising results. Despite all the efforts, we still lost the 
market share in 2012.” (Manager of the Northern 
District, Case C) 
 
“We panicked (due to the failure of the firm’s IPO), 
looking for every possibility to make money and to make 
the financial records look pretty […] we did not know 
what we were doing; we were kind of lost. The core 
competitiveness no longer existed.” (Co-founder, Case 
C) 
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Pattern 
Business model design Entrepreneurial action 
Implications for firm performance 
Complex Innovation 
Complex 
Innovation 
“The food delivery service is naturally 
linked to our food and drink deals. It is 
based on our strength and it reinforces our 
strength in the segment (foods and 
drinks).” (Co-founder, Case A) 
 
“We are not only an OGB company. We 
can do everything related to local services 
(movie, hotel, and food delivery).” (Co-
founder, Case A) 
 
“Several steps (innovations) were needed 
to enable customers to make fast purchase 
decisions in mobile apps” (Co-founder, 
Case B) 
 
“It was a long process to develop the 
(O2O1) platform […] we knew it would be 
a difficult process that involves a lot of 
reconstructions, reconfigurations and 
reintegration” (Co-founder, Case B) 
 
“The movie-related 
businesses were all 
innovations in the OGB 
market.” 
(Co-founder, Case A) 
 
“We were crystal clear that 
our business should not be 
limited to the OGB. We 
would expand to the O2O* 
market for sure.”  (Co-
founder, Case A) 
 
“No one else was able to 
develop the O2O1 
platform.” 
(Co-founder, Case B) 
“When all OGB companies developed the CRM system, 
we had the merchant service system. When they copied 
the merchant service system, we had other systems ready 
to use. The competitors cannot copy all the systems. 
They would have missed the best timing even if they can 
copy them all, because these things (system 
developments) take time.” (Co-founder, Case A) 
 
“After the complex innovation was introduced), the 
relationship with both merchants and consumers was 
strengthened […] The number of merchants who 
cooperated with us increased at least 30% in 2011[…] 
(In 2012), the total solution became the key to attract 
merchants and consumers. I would say that the total 
solution is key for winning the market.” (Finance 
Director, Case B) 
1O2O = Online to Offline 
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Pattern 
Business model design Entrepreneurial action 
Implications for firm performance 
Complex Imitation 
Complex 
Imitation 
“We have come such a long way to design 
the business model (adapt the SOLOMO 
elements in the business model). Although 
the ways of using the (consumer and 
merchant) databases have changed over 
time, it is always the elements of social, 
location and mobile that sits at the core of 
Case I.” (Founder, Case I) 
 
“We first began by linking the deals to the 
word-of-mouth and the social media 
platform-based promotions […] then the 
check-in was added. When a consumer 
checks in at one shop, his/her friends 
receive a notification about which store 
he/she checked-in and what deals are 
available at the shop […] This requires a 
very good integration of the social with the 
location elements.” (Co-founder, Case D). 
“We knew that Case A built 
up the CRM system and we 
learned the system from 
them, we even did a better 
job comparing to them […] 
we made successive 
improvements that get the 
most out of the system.” 
(COO, Case D) 
 
“Case C inspired us to 
combine the deals with 
social media. We just 
happen to have the social 
media platform that allowed 
us to add check-ins (to a 
nearby shop).” (Co-founder, 
Case D). 
“You might have noticed this, the boom of deals (revenue 
per deal) actually started from us. Although Case A and C 
developed a few deals, the revenue per deal was not very 
good. When we introduced the first deal that was promoted 
through the collaboration between us and the social media 
platform of our parent company, it was a movie ticket deal. 
CN¥19 for two tickets. We sold (this deal) 300,000 times. It 
was crazy. Many office workers were buying the deal. 
Even we did not expect such an amazing outcome.” (COO, 
Case D) 
 
“All the moves make sense now […] We cannot achieve 
location-based promotions without the preliminary work, 
even though we did not really link our work together 
before.” (Co-founder, Case E) 
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Appendix D. Applications of Business Model Evolution Patterns  
Case Illustrative quotes of patterns dominating in the process of competition  
A 
Complex innovation:  
- “This (the complex innovation around the restaurant, movie, hotel, and food-delivery) has been the core of our business model 
development. See how much time we used to develop the core elements, from 2010 till now (2013).” (Co-founder, Case A) 
- “We knew from the beginning that the company would need the innovations around the IT systems […] we (postponed) many 
programs and projects at that time. We were afraid of losing the market too. However, we never thought about giving up on the 
innovations.” (Co-founder, Case A) 
Complex imitation: 
- “I always think it does not matter if it is new, what matters is whether it is useful, that is, if customers have a demand for it. Does this 
idea come from competitors or us? As long as it works, why does it matter?” (Co-founder, Case A) 
B 
Complex innovation:  
- “Everybody collects consumer reviews, but we are the only one who use the reviews so well. The competitors cannot know what is in 
our mind - even though they have the data […] our entire business model is based on the collection, analysis, and application of 
data. This is our strength.” (Co-founder, Case B) 
Complex imitation: 
- “We entered the OGB market later than the others (A and C). There has been a learning process where we explored what they have 
been doing and what we can do better than they. This has been crucial […] C introduced location-based services but we can do 
better, for example, the “search around”-app provided an additional contact point.” (Co-founder, Case B) 
C 
Simple innovation: 
- “I believe that we were the most innovative company in the OGB industry at that time (from 2010 to 2012). We introduced so many 
innovations that all the OGB companies copied us, even Groupon imitated us.” (Co-founder, Case C) 
- “Now when I think about it, they (the simple innovations between late 2011 and early 2012) hardly brought any promising results. 
Despite all the efforts, we still lost market share in 2012. We were almost doomed to failure (in 2012).”  (Manager of the Northern 
District, Case C)  
D 
Simple and complex imitation: 
- “We were basically a follower in previous years, although we have done a great job in integrating the business model designs (of the 
competitors) into our own business model […] we have been especially strong in incorporating social elements in the business 
model, and location-based elements too. We are still much smaller than Case A but we perform strongly in tier one cities (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen). These cities accept our business model and brand image quiet quickly. That’s how we compete 
and will keep competing with Case A.” (Co-founder, Case D) 
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E 
Simple and complex imitation: 
- “This (total solution for liquor sellers) (a complex imitation) is similar to the customer relationship management of the others (OGB 
firms). The principles (of designing the business models) are the same (between E and competitors). Managing the supplier (one side 
of the platform) relationships determines our survival or death. I am sure you understand this. We will have nothing to sell if there 
are no suppliers.” (COO, Case E) 
F 
Simple imitation: 
- “I do not understand why people have so many negative feelings about imitation. Being ashamed about imitation is like being 
ashamed about tracking the development of the industry. We did a few imitations. Some of the imitations worked well. Why is 
introducing a similar activity as a defense wrong?” (Founder, Case F) 
G 
Simple imitation: 
- “We have always tried to stay close to the top firms (competitors).” (Co-founder, Case G) 
- “We copied it (an innovation of Case A) because we were afraid of being left out in the industry.” (Co-founder, Case G) 
H 
Simple and complex imitation: 
- “Case A kind of set up the rule in the industry. We just accepted it very quickly. There were not too many things to think about really.” 
(Founder, Case H) 
- “Why not (copying the innovation)? Everybody has been providing multi-deals. It had been a couple of months since the innovation 
was introduced. The business model of multi-deals per day had proven its success in the market.” (Marketing Director, Case H) 
- “Developing the total solution to target the WeChat shops (a complex imitation) has been the most crucial task of this year (2013). 
This is the only chance for us to continue doing business in this industry or even possibly take a leading position.” (Founder, Case 
H) 
I 
Simple and complex imitation: 
- “I am a big fan of the C2B (business model) (a complex imitation). To me, the nature of doing business is to understand customer 
demands. Customers may not know what products/services they really desire ten or twenty years ago. (However,) everybody has 
demands and can tell people what the demands are today. This has been my motivation of developing the business model and how 
we differentiate from the traditional OGB sites (the competitors).” (Founder, Case I) 
J 
Simple imitation: 
- “Separating the goods deals from local service deals (a simple imitation) contributed a lot to the sales in the beginning of 2011. That 
was how we survived the fierce competition in early 2011.” (Founder, Case J) 
- “We mostly focused on defending (using imitations).” (Founder, Case J) 
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K 
Simple innovation: 
- “I don’t feel comfortable to transform the business model every day. We are a small, niche OGB site that focuses on a specific 
business model (a simple innovation). We had three employees, including me, at the beginning. I need to spend time on refining the 
details of the business (at the operational level), not on changing the business model every day.” (Founder, Case K) 
L 
Simple innovation: 
- “I am a software engineer. All the things (innovations) I do (develop) are based on software engineering. The OGB aggregator 
(business model) is simple and clear to me. I noticed the other business models like Tuan800 (a follower that further developed the 
OGB aggregator business model) that has a social community (but) we were completely confident about our business model; we felt 
no changes were required. The aggregator (business model) was the baseline.” (Founder, Case L) 
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